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TaxThemis: Interactive Mining and Exploration of
Suspicious Tax Evasion Groups
Yating Lin*, Kamkwai Wong*, Yong Wang, Rong Zhang, Bo Dong, Huamin Qu, Qinghua Zheng
Fig. 1. The system interface of TaxThemis: (A) The Control Panel consists of a bar chart to show the temporal summary of the daily
related party’s daily transaction amounts, together with a parameter selector to support network fusion through interactively setting
the preferred period or relevant thresholds. (B) The Group Overview visualizes the topology of related party transactions in each
suspicious group, and ranks the groups by their group features. This helps users focus on the most suspicious groups. (C) The
Graph View shows the hierarchical investment relationships and related party transactions within the selected suspicious group. It
supports group assessment in revealing the common beneficial owners and former tax evaders. (D) The Detail View presents the
profit status of the traders who conducted the selected related party transactions, revealing their suspicious behavior of transferring
revenue transfers.
Abstract— Tax evasion is a serious economic problem for many countries, as it can undermine the government’s tax system and
lead to an unfair business competition environment. Recent research has applied data analytics techniques to analyze and detect
tax evasion behaviors of individual taxpayers. However, they have failed to support the analysis and exploration of the related party
transaction tax evasion (RPTTE) behaviors (e.g., transfer pricing), where a group of taxpayers is involved. In this paper, we present
TaxThemis, an interactive visual analytics system to help tax officers mine and explore suspicious tax evasion groups through an-
alyzing heterogeneous tax-related data. A taxpayer network is constructed and fused with the respective trade network to detect
suspicious RPTTE groups. Rich visualizations are designed to facilitate the exploration and investigation of suspicious transactions
between related taxpayers with profit and topological data analysis. Specifically, we propose a calendar heatmap with a carefully-
designed encoding scheme to intuitively show the evidence of transferring revenue through related party transactions. We demon-
strate the usefulness and effectiveness of TaxThemis through two case studies on real-world tax-related data and interviews with
domain experts.
Index Terms—Visual Analytics, Tax Network, Tax Evasion Detection, Anomaly detection, Multidimensional data
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1 INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion is a financial crime against the tax system in which taxpay-
ers deliberately report false financial positions to deny their tax obli-
gations. It has become a severe economic problem for many countries
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resulting in a significant tax gap, i.e., the difference between the tax
revenue the government is entitled to and the actual revenue collected.
For example, the predicted tax gap for 28 European Union countries
was, on average, $51.9 billion, nearly 7.7% of their 2015 GDP [31]. In
the United States, the estimated tax gap was at $441 billion for 2011-
2013, or about 2.7% of their GDP [34]. In Australia, the estimated
tax gap was at $21.9 billion in 2015, roughly 2.2% of its GDP [29].
Aside from less revenue for government budgets, tax evasion has also
led to an unfair business competition environment, especially for com-
pliant taxpayers whose operating costs are consequently higher than
their non-compliant competitors. Such a phenomenon would eventu-
ally incur more tax non-compliance to challenge the tax system [28].
Tax authorities have expended tremendous efforts in trying to re-
duce the tax gap and curtail tax evasion behaviors. Many computer-
aided case selection approaches have been widely used to detect indi-
vidual tax evasion behaviors, such as account manipulation [11,16,21,
23,39] and false invoices [8]. However, these approaches mainly focus
on detecting individual tax evaders by designing a set of financial in-
dicators and further training a classifier model to classify the taxpayer
entities. They are not able to detect Related Party Transaction-based
Tax Evasion(RPTTE) behaviors, where groups of related taxpayers are
involved in illegally redistributing their profits and losses to reduce
the overall tax burden [25, 33]. The RPTTE behaviors are often con-
ducted through related party transactions and transfer pricing and have
become a growing global trend in tax evasion [7, 17, 20]. Thus, the ef-
fective mining and exploration of tax evasion groups are of significant
importance in reducing the tax gap.
However, it is challenging to analyze and explore tax evasion
groups effectively. First, the detection of tax evasion groups depends
on the analysis of the topological interest relationship between differ-
ent taxpayers and their various tax-related attributes, making it quite
complex to explore tax evasion groups. Second, the ambiguity in the
accounting principle has resulted in a time-consuming audit procedure
for tax officers to check manually if a suspicious group conducts tax
evasion. Even the recent state-of-the-art approaches for automated
tax evasion group detection [35, 36] can result in a high false-positive
rate and an overwhelming number of suspicious cases. Third, corre-
lating a large amount of financial data and related party transactions
and their analysis is time-consuming, complicating the exploration of
suspicious patterns of tax evasion groups.
To handle the above challenges, we attempt to employ visual an-
alytics to assist tax officers with the mining and exploration of sus-
picious tax evasion groups. We have worked closely with a provin-
cial tax administration office in China for two years to understand the
detailed requirements of tax evasion detection and exploration. We
investigated the detailed tax-related data, including taxpayer profile
information, audit, trade, and investment records. Our collaborators
in the tax administration office provided all the data used in this pa-
per after conducting data masking on the original data. We aim to
tightly integrate the domain knowledge of tax officers with the compu-
tational power of machines and the expressiveness of visual analytics.
We present TaxThemis, an interactive visual analytic system, to help
tax officers explore and identify suspicious tax evasion groups. We
first propose a network fusion algorithm adapted from a graph-based
tax evasion group detection approach [35] to identify any suspicious
RPTTE groups, where the formulation of the taxpayer network was
modified according to the requirements posed by our collaborators.
Furthermore, we propose a set of coupled visual designs to assist tax
officers in the exploration of suspicious RPTTE groups.
As shown in Fig. 1, TaxThemis consists of four major views: the
Control Panel, the Group Overview, the Graph View, and the Detail
View. The Control Panel consists of a bar chart showing the temporal
summary of the daily related party transaction amount, and a parame-
ter selector to support network fusion through interactively setting the
preferred period or relevant thresholds. The Group Overview shows a
list of suspicious RPTTE groups, in which each row represents a suspi-
cious RPTTE group and consists of an arc-diagram based glyph and a
bar chart to help users focus on the most suspicious groups. The Graph
View shows the investment and trading relationships within the se-
lected suspicious group. The Detail View shows the profit status of the
traders who conducted the related party transaction for profit analysis.
We have applied this system to the real tax dataset and demonstrated
its effectiveness through case studies and expert interviews. Our con-
tributions can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate the design requirements for interactive mining and
visual exploration of tax evasion groups, together with two do-
main experts, that is, an experienced tax officer from a provincial
tax administration office and a tax researcher from a university
in China.
• We present an interactive visual analytics system, TaxThemis, to
enable the quick exploration and inspection of tax evasion groups
with topological and profit analysis. The proposed intuitive and
carefully-designed visualizations provide an overview and de-
tailed explorations of tax evasion groups. To the best of our
knowledge, TaxThemis is the first visual analytics system that
is designed for detecting and exploring tax evasion groups by
analyzing related party transaction-based tax evasion (RPTTE)
behaviors.
• We conducted two case studies with a real tax dataset and well-
structured expert interviews with two domain experts, which
demonstrate the effectiveness and usefulness of TaxThemis.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we summarize the techniques that are most related to
our work, including tax evasion detection methods and visualization
techniques for financial data.
2.1 Tax Evasion Detection
The majority of the literature in computer-based tax inspection falls
into two categories: machine learning methods and network-based
methods.
Machine Learning Methods. These methods mainly focus on
proposing models to calculate the suspicion scores of taxpayers fraud
intentions [8,13,16,32]. For example, the Chilean administration used
decision trees, neural networks, and Bayesian networks to calculate
the suspicion scores of taxpayers based on the features extracted from
the information of taxpayers and the related invoice data [8]. The
Iranian tax administration proposed a hybrid model to detect corpo-
rate tax evasion by using the multi-layer perceptron neural network,
support vector machine, and logistic regression classification models
in combination with the harmony search optimization algorithm [32].
Kim et al. developed a multi-class predictive tool to detect fraudulent
financial misstatements [16]. Hglund developed a genetic algorithm-
based decision support tool for predicting tax payment defaults [13].
Although the machine learning-based methods can classify taxpay-
ers with suspicion scores calculated by pre-trained models, they are not
explainable to tax inspectors and are highly reliant on training data. It
is therefore difficult to verify the methods’ efficiency since they have
a high false positive rate.
Network-based Methods. These methods aim to explore specific
patterns of tax evasion based on a social network of taxpayers, which is
the so-called taxpayer interest interacted network(TPIIN) [33, 35, 36].
Tian et al. first proposed a color-based model to represent the type
of taxpayer and their relationships. They summarized tax evasion pat-
terns based on audit cases and presented a pattern matching algorithm
to explore suspicious tax evasion groups in terms of graph theory [35].
To conduct comprehensive research on the affiliated-transaction-based
tax evasion group, Ruan et al. proposed a hybrid method for identi-
fying suspicious groups via three steps: tax rate differential detection,
topological pattern matching, and tax burden abnormality identifica-
tion [33]. Other work by Tselykh et al. presented an attributed-graph-
based approach to detect suspicious fraudulent transfer pricing entities
with clustering and rule induction techniques [36].
Research conducted by the network-based method has effectively
detected typical tax evasion groups with specific expert-summarized
patterns. However, the algorithms generate a large number of suspi-
cious groups that contain a lot of false positives and need to be identi-
fied with extra effort.
2.2 Financial Data Visualization
A number of visualization techniques have been developed for finan-
cial data, in view of its complex data structure and significant impact
in application fields. We have summarized related financial data vi-
sualization works into three categories: time-series data visualization,
multivariate graph visualization, and financial crime visualization.
Time-series Data Visualization. Temporal data is prevalent in
many problem domains. The visualization community has developed
numerous visual techniques and have applied them in analyzing time-
series data in different fields, which facilitate the detection, explo-
ration, and prediction of several specific tasks. For example, Guo et
al. proposed a visualization system with a thread-based design to sup-
port progression stage identification in time-series events [9]. Malik
et al. proposed a visualization framework for spatio-temporal corre-
lations analysis [22]. With the popularity of digital transactions, a
mass of time-series trade data has been collected by financial institu-
tions, which promote the adoption of visual analytics approaches to
analyze transaction events. Previous work on visualizing time-series
trade data aims at exploring correlations between trade goods, network
patterns, and time-series signatures. Hong Wang et al. proposed a
spatio-temporal trade network visualization to explore the relationship
between global trade networks and regional instability [38]. Xie et al.
also introduced a visualization system called VAET to detect salient
transactions from large e-transaction time-series [40]. Work by Yue
et al. proposed a novel dynamic timeline visualization to explore the
evolutionary transaction patterns of Bitcoin exchanges from two per-
spectives [41]. Instead of focusing on the process and the correlation,
this paper concentrates on the analysis of the continuous profit time
sequences of suspect traders in a tax evasion group.
Multivariate Graph Visualization. Multivariate graph visualiza-
tion is widely used in topological data analysis as it is intuitive and in-
teractive. To facilitate global exploration, Elzen et al. proposed a large-
scale multivariate network visualization method with rich interactions
to support selections and aggregations [37]. Focusing on exploring
the local subgraphs, Pienta et al. presented common visual encoding
schemes to embed the features of nodes and links [30]. For intuitively
displaying the network topology together with the correlation analysis
of multiple entity attributes, Nobre et al. proposed the tree+table mul-
tivariate graph visualization technique [26]. Different from previous
works, our works focus on analyzing any suspicious phenomenon by
showing its topology and suspicion attributes of entity to help locate
the most suspicious links, then further show the context of the link to
facilitate its identification.
Financial Crime Visualization. The visual analytic technique has
proved its importance in detecting financial fraud [6, 15, 18]. An early
work of Kirkland et al. adopted artificial intelligence, visualization,
pattern recognition, and data mining to support fraud detection analy-
sis [32]. Huang et al. proposed a VA system, and use 3D treemaps
to monitor the real-time stock market performance and identify a par-
ticular stock that produced an unusual trading pattern [12]. Work by
Chang et al. proposed WireVis, using a keyword graph, the strings,
and bead visualization to allows the analysts to see the complete rela-
tionship between accounts, keywords, time, and patterns of activity in
transaction data to support fraud detection [2]. Didimo et al. presented
VISFAN, a visual analytics system that uses social network analysis
combined with a clustering algorithm to support analysts with effec-
tive tools to discover financial crimes, like money laundering and fraud
in financial activity networks [5]. Work by Leite et al. proposed EVA,
which offers a scoring mechanism with interactive visual analytics fa-
cilities to perform fraud validation [19]. Recently introduced are a few
analytic systems for tax fraud detection. The Italian Revenue Agency
proposed a decision support system for detecting specific patterns of
tax evasion groups [3]. They later applied a system based on pattern
matching and risk information diffusion to support public officers in
identifying crafty taxpayers [4].
Our work differs from others in that we mainly focus on the
task of exploring the RPTTE group. We have come up with sev-
eral coordinated visualizations with carefully-designed visual encod-
ing schemes to support interactive mining and the exploration of sus-
picious groups.
3 BACKGROUND AND DATA DESCRIPTION
As introduced in Section 1, we aim at detecting tax evasion groups
to reduce the tax gap. Some core concepts regarding tax evasion are
clarified below to help comprehend the background. A taxpayer is
another taxpayer’s related party if they share a common beneficial
owner or are connected in an interest relationship other than invest-
ment (e.g., kinship). Related party transaction refers to the transferal
of assets, goods and services between related parties. Conducting a
related party transaction is legal as long as the traders satisfy their
tax obligations [27]. However, when such behavior is conducted to
redistribute their profits and losses to reduce the overall tax burden,
it is criminal behavior and is referred to as Related Party Transaction-
based Tax Evasion(RPTTE) [25,33]. The set of taxpayers who perform
RPTTE and the corresponding investors form a RPTTE group. In this
paper, we focus on the detection and exploration of RPTTE groups.
We analyze the raw tax-related data to ensure it supports our an-
alytic approach. We have worked closely with two domain experts,
one of whom is a tax officer from a provincial tax administration and
one is a tax evasion detection researcher from a cooperative research
group. They have guided us through the tax-related data that they pos-
sess and use in their current tax inspection routine. One main duty of
the tax administration officers is to find related party transactions and
search for evidence, which is often done by carefully examining the
tax-related data and monitoring certain confidential financial indica-
tors. Tax-related data includes taxpayer and investor profiles, invoice
information, and audit records. We provide a brief introduction to the
three types of tax-related data used for tax evasion detection and anal-
ysis.
Taxpayer and Investor Profiles: A taxpayer is a person or organi-
zation (such as a company) who needs to pay taxes to the government.
An investor is a person or organization that buys shares in taxpayers
and holds voting rights. Our collaborator offered us the profile infor-
mation of each taxpayer and the corresponding investors. The taxpayer
profile describes the business nature of taxpayers, such as industry,
major merchandise, ownership type, and so on. The corresponding
investor information includes investor entity type, investment amount,
and share ratio. There are over 4 million taxpayers and 0.9 million
investors in the entire dataset provided by our collaborator. This infor-
mation helps us understand the topology of investment relationships
of all taxpayers.
Invoice Information: The invoice information is collected to
record the details of each transaction between taxpayers. We obtained
14 million Value-Added-Tax (VAT) invoices in Shaanxi Province and
the time range of the invoices is from Jan 1, 2014 to Dec 31, 2015.
Each invoice record consists of five attributes: date, seller, buyer, VAT
tax amount, and the transaction amount. The buyer and seller in an
invoice record are two taxpayers, of whom, at least one of them, are
registered in Shaanxi Province. The invoices explain the trading rela-
tionships among the taxpayers and show the cash flow of the taxpayers
regarding transactions.
Audit Records: Audit records refer to the results after a tax admin-
istration officer conducts an official examination on a taxpayer’s finan-
cial account. Our collaborators offered us historical audit records to
help analyze each case and develop our system. Each auditing record
consists of audit date, violation type, case description, action taken,
and tax payable. Together with the taxpayer profile, we can trace the
tax evasion history of taxpayers.
4 REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
To better understand user requirements when users analyze and ex-
plore tax evasion groups, we have been working closely with two do-
main experts E1 and E2 over the past two years. We recruited experts
from our collaborating organization (a provincial tax administration
and a research group). Expert E1 is a tax officer who has worked in
the tax office for over 20 years and is proficient in tax risk manage-
ment and audit procedures in China. His job duties are to identify
high-risk companies with the risk management system, interview sus-
picious companies and investigate their reported financial statements.
Expert E2 is a tax researcher who has been working on tax evasion
research projects over the past five years and has cooperated closely
with at least five provincial tax offices in China. His research inter-
ests focus on developing fast tax evasion group detection algorithms
to improve the efficiency of the tax inspection.
We conducted a series of structured face-to-face interviews and re-
mote meetings with the domain experts. We are concerned with three
aspects of tax evasion inspection: 1) What are the common practices
and their procedures for detecting and analyzing tax evasion groups?
2) What are the major challenges and limitations of the current meth-
ods for finding and exploring tax evading groups? 3) What kind of
design requirements and tasks do they want to achieve?
Through the interview sessions, the experts clarified the current au-
dit procedure which mainly consists of three steps. First, the tax eva-
sion group detection conventionally relies on random selection and
confidential financial indicators calculated from taxpayers’ period-end
financial positions. Second, the tax administration officers summon
and interview the accounting representatives who prepare and disclose
the financial statements for the suspected taxpayers. To facilitate the
fact-finding process, the officers may conduct field work and request
additional proper business records. Third, the transactions and infor-
mation gathered are examined to discover supporting evidence and cir-
cumstantial evidence. Such an operation for tax evasion group detec-
tion and exploration involves a massive amount of manual checking of
the raw tax related data, which is tedious and time consuming.
To harness the computational power of machine, some automated
tax evasion group detection algorithms have already been proposed
and used for detecting suspicious tax evasion groups [33, 35]. How-
ever, these automated algorithms, which focus on the topological pat-
terns of tax evasion groups instead of their tax evasion behaviors, can
produce a lot of false positives which are costly to verify. They are
also unable to provide the suspicious invoices for tax administration
officers to make audit decisions upon or prioritize, owing to their lim-
ited investigative resources. Another key design goal is how to handle
these issues for TaxThemis. With these limitations in mind, we summa-
rized the feedback from experts and further compiled a list of design
requirements to guide the designs of TaxThemis.
R1 Enable interactive configurations for suspicious RPTTE
groups detection. The automated algorithms significantly im-
prove the efficiency of the tax inspection procedure when they
can successfully identify the most relevant suspicious RPTTE
groups. As mentioned by E2, different users may want to ex-
plore RPTTE groups that satisfy specific conditions and would
like to configure different parameters to extend or narrow down
the scope of suspicious groups by filtering taxpayers not tightly
connected to the related party transactions. For example, differ-
ent users may have an interest in detecting tax evasion groups
from different periods, and exploring tax evasion groups with a
specific relevance or complexity.
R2 Rank suspicious tax evasion groups with multiple criteria.
Given the vast number of suspicious groups, it is critical to help
users quickly locate groups with the highest risk level. The sys-
tem should support the sorting of the groups based on multiple
criteria which reflects the suspicion in different dimensions. For
example, according to E1’s audit experience, one of the major
suspicion criteria is the existence of historical tax evasion records
because those groups are likely to commit tax evasion again.
R3 Support the interactive exploration of the common beneficial
owners of taxpayers who conduct the related party transac-
tions and their attributes. As at least one common beneficial
owner will benefit from RPTTE behaviors, exploring the invest-
ment and trading relationships helps users to understand how the
tax evasion scheme works among taxpayers. In addition, the at-
tributes of taxpayers such as historical tax evasion records pro-
vide the tax administration officers a context for suspicion and
risk evaluation. Therefore, the experts require that all taxpayer
with a common beneficial owner should also be clearly visu-
alized, facilitating the deep exploration and inspection of any
highly suspicious related party transactions.
R4 Provide convenient profit analysis of taxpayers that con-
ducted related party transactions. To facilitate the tax inspec-
tion process, the users need to know how the taxpayers redis-
tribute their profits through RPTTE behaviors. It is also impor-
tant to present the related party transaction as evidence for users
to quickly make audit decisions. Both E1 and E2 agree that the
evaluation of suspicious related party transactions is challenging
because tax evaders try their best to disguise their transactions
as legal ones. However, the intent of such transactions must be
reflected in reported profits, which leads to a lower tax burden.
Therefore, profit analysis can act as the critical context to help
users in decision-making. The visualization should display the
profit status of the taxpayers, as the analysis of profit variations
can reveal whether the related party transaction behaviors affect
the overall tax burden.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN
We propose an interactive tax inspection system, TaxThemis, to help
tax administration officers explore and identify suspicious RPTTE
groups. By following the design requirements discussed in Section 3,
TaxThemis first discovers groups of taxpayers who conducted related
party transactions within a specific period and then examines their
group characteristics as well as financial performances. Our system
integrates the traditional data mining algorithm with visual analytics
techniques. As shown in Fig. 2, TaxThemis consists of three major
modules: the Data Preprocessing module, the Data Analysis module,
and the Visual Analysis module.
The Data Preprocessing module performs both data masking and
network construction. Data masking aims to avoid revealing the
identity of taxpayers and guarantees privacy protection for taxpayers,
which is critically important in such sensitive data exploration. Net-
work construction refers to the extraction of the investment and trading
relationship from the masked data. Inspired by the widely-used graph
mining algorithm [35], we construct a taxpayer network and a trade
network to model the two relationships.
TheData Analysismodule fuses the taxpayer network and the trade
network based on the parameters used to detect suspicious RPTTE
groups. To help different users perform RPTTE group detection ac-
cording to their exploration goals, we enable users to determine the
extent of the suspicious RPTTE groups interactively. To facilitate the
convenient exploration of these groups, we further extract tax evasion
related features from them. These features can either characterize the
RPTTE groups or delineate the related party transactions).
The Visual Analysis module presents the suspicious RPTTE
groups together with the corresponding contexts and detailed evidence
through intuitive visualizations. It facilitates a convenient exploration
and in-depth examination of RPTTE groups with these linked visual-
ization views. All these modules are built and integrated as a web-
based system, where the backend is developed with Python and Flask
to support data preprocessing and data analysis. The frontend is imple-
mented by JavaScript, Vue, and D3 to build visualization views and
support interaction.
5.1 Data Preprocessing Module
This module turns the raw data from our collaborators into a taxpayer
network and a trade network.
Data Masking. Since the profile information of taxpayers and in-
vestors must be kept confidential, we preprocess the raw data with
data masking. For identifiable taxpayer information, we add scram-
bled characters and masked specific fields of taxpayers’ information
Fig. 2. System architecture and data processing pipeline. TaxThemis consists of three major modules: the Data Preprocessing module, the Data
Analysis module, and the Visual Analysis module. The Data Preprocessing module preprocesses the raw tax-related data with the data masking
techniques and constructs the taxpayer network and the trade network. The Data Analysis module fuses the two networks based on the parameters
and extracts features of each group to help further ranking and analysis. The Visual Analysis module supports interactively mining and exploration
of suspicious RPTTE groups through four coordinated views.
so they are not easily identifiable. For the invoice information, we
apply the numeric variance algorithm [24] for masking but preserv-
ing the date distribution. Through verification by our collaborators,
the data masking solutions provide adequate confidentiality to the raw
records and prevent others from obtaining the actual identifications of
taxpayers from the masked data.
Network Construction. Similar to prior research [35], we also fuse
multiple data sources and construct a taxpayer network to facilitate fur-
ther analysis. We first formulate the taxpayer network with taxpayers
and investors, where the nodes can be both taxpayers and investors,
and edges represent investment relationships. Then we provide more
information about the nodes by fusing their profile information and
audit records to the network. A connected component in the result-
ing directed graph reflects that of a related party. We further adjust
the taxpayer network according to our design requirements (R1) and
domain knowledge.
Pruning is necessary as the original dataset contains almost 5 mil-
lion nodes (i.e., taxpayers and investors), which creates a massive bur-
den on the performance of the subsequent network fusion. We prune
the related parties that contain only one taxpayer, which are not ad-
equate enough for performing any related party transactions. Our
collaborators point out that according to the regulations, a necessary
condition for convicting related party transactions is that there exists
a common shareholder who holds 10% or more of the voting rights.
We model this regulation by removing investors who have less than
10% final investment ratio over any taxpayers from our network. The
final investment ratio of an investor is defined as the maximum prod-
uct of investment ratios for all paths starting from the investor to any
end nodes. We build a trade network with the invoice data filtered
by the nodes in the taxpayer network, as taxpayers not in the network
must be innocent of RPTTE. The trade network serves two purposes:
it helps calculate the taxpayers’ cumulative daily profits by aggregat-
ing all edges, and can be fused with the taxpayer network to obtain all
related party transactions. If both the buyer and seller of an invoice
belong to the same component in the taxpayer network(i.e., related
party), it is a related party transaction.
5.2 Data Analysis Module
This module detects suspicious RPTTE groups by fusing the networks
based on the parameters, and extracts features of each group to help
further ranking and analysis.
Suspicious RPTTE Group Detection. TaxThemis provides inter-
active queries to assist tax administration officers in detecting any sus-
picious RPTTE groups within the period of concern and the ideal
information-seeking space. Suspicious RPTTE group detection pri-
marily performs network fusion, which aims to corroborate the suspi-
ciousness of the related parties in the taxpayer network with invoices
as evidence. The edges in the trade network (i.e., transactions) are
fused into the taxpayer network if both ends of the edge (i.e., buy-
ers and sellers) exist and are reachable in the taxpayer network (i.e.,
related party). The resulting network is a directed graph of multi-
ple disjoint components, i.e., suspicious RPTTE groups. We remove
the groups that have not committed any related party transactions to
present the most appropriate output.
On some occasions, such a method for detecting suspicious RPTTE
groups generates an enormous related party due to a few super-
connectors who have invested in various large corporations. We in-
troduce two relevant thresholds to cut the large components and di-
vide the huge groups, namely, the maximum transaction chain length
and the maximum control chain length. Our collaborator tells us that
tax evaders seldom commit RPTTE with loosely related taxpayers as
it would involve more witnesses and thus increases the risk of being
exposed. The maximum transaction chain length lets users decide to
what extent the network fusion algorithm should connect the end nodes
of any component with related party transactions. It is defined as the
maximum shortest path length for the buyer and seller to be consid-
ered reachable. Moreover, from the experience of domain experts, a
related party involving historical tax evaders tends to commit tax eva-
sion again. Therefore, nodes that have not conducted related party
transactions should not be naively pruned as they might be former tax
evaders. The maximum control chain length lets users decide the max-
imum shortest path length for investors and taxpayers to be considered
reachable, which can effectively control the size of the related parties.
Feature Extraction. We extract features that characterize the
RPTTE group and the taxpayers (e.g., the number of taxpayers with
evasion records and the cumulative daily profit of the taxpayers). The
cumulative daily profit modeled by accumulating the cash flows ap-
plies to invoices from the beginning to the end of a tax period. We
also extract features that delineate the related party transactions (e.g.,
the daily related party transaction amount and the number of effective
related party transactions). We define a related party transaction as
effective when the transaction takes place between two affiliates who
differ in profit status, reported as one of the standard settings for trans-
fer pricing [25]. Clarifying, when buyers in profit purchase goods and
services from sellers in loss, the tax evasion incentive is obvious and
should be further investigated. All the features extracted by the Data
Analysis module are shown in the Visual Analysis module to help tax
experts select, compare, and explore according to their priorities.
5.3 Visual Analysis Module
The Visual Analysis module supports interactively mining and explo-
ration of suspicious RPTTE groups through four coordinated views.
The related traders of the related party transaction 
The related party transaction
The transaction amount
The number of taxpayer with crime record
The related party transaction amount
The number of effective related party transactions
 one-way trading
two-way trading 
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
Fig. 3. Alternative designs and visual encoding for visualizing the related
party transactions in a group: (a1) arc diagram, (a2) Sankey diagram,
(a3) chord diagram, and the legend for features: (b1) bar chart, (b2)
radar chart, (b3) parallel coordinates plot. Our design used (a1) and
(b1) in consideration of the design requirements.
As shown in Fig. 1, the interface of TaxThemis consists of four ma-
jor UI components: a) The Control Panel configures the period and
relevant thresholds for network fusion. b) The Group Overview dis-
plays any of the suspicious RPTTE groups ranked by selected features.
c) The Graph View visualizes the ownership topology and trade rela-
tionships in the selected RPTTE group. d) The Detail View shows
the cumulative profit status of the two taxpayers connected by the se-
lected related party transactions. All the views are developed to bring
forward different contexts for identifying suspicious RPTTE groups
interactively.
5.3.1 Control Panel
The Control Panel (Fig. 1(A)) consists of a bar chart and a parameter
selector to support network fusion through interactively setting the pre-
ferred period or relevant thresholds. The bar chart on the right-hand
side of the Control Panel offers a temporal summary of the daily re-
lated party transaction amount, which reveals a cyclic pattern where
most of the peaks are near the end of the month. Since the profit ma-
nipulation should happen after tax evaders know how much taxable
income they have, we speculate that this information can work as a
visual cue to guide the tax administration officers in conducting their
exploration of the suspicious RPTTE groups. Users can select their
period of concern by brushing or clicking a bar to automatically select
the quarter, which is a typical tax period (R1).
The parameter selector allows users to configure the maximum
transaction chain length and maximum control chain length for the al-
gorithm to determine the extent of the suspicious RPTTE groups (R1).
As every combination of the period and relevant thresholds results in
a different set of suspicious groups, a query by using taxpayer ID is
available to track a particular taxpayer in different periods and locate
it to see if the relevant thresholds have over-pruned or under-pruned
the group. All the visualizations intend to help users narrow down or
extend the information-seeking space on demand. The results of the
algorithm show suspicious groups detected in the group overview.
5.3.2 Group Overview
The Group Overview (Fig. 1(B)) shows a list of suspicious RPTTE
groups, in which each row represents a suspicious RPTTE group, and
consists of an arc-diagram based glyph and a bar chart to help users
focus on the most suspicious groups (R2). We extend the arc dia-
gram as a glyph to visualize the topology of the related party transac-
tions, which allows users to estimate the complexity of the suspicious
RPTTE group quickly. The nodes representing traders are arranged
Taxpayer with crime record 
InvestorBorder Color:
Fill Color:
Label:
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Node: Link? Transaction
Investment
Fig. 4. The visual encoding scheme for the Graph View.
on a horizontal baseline, while the arcs indicating the related party
transactions are drawn in a clockwise direction to show the trading di-
rection. The profit flows from left to right are positioned above the
horizontal line, and the flows from right to left are shown below to
avoid visual clutter. The arc width encodes the transaction amount,
which is also employed in the graph view, complying with the consis-
tent encoding design principle [1].
The bar chart shows three group features, including the number
of taxpayers with tax evasion records, the related party transaction
amount, and the number of effective related party transactions (R2).
By default, the number of effective related party transactions is se-
lected to rank the groups because the feature is engineered to represent
one of the standard settings for transfer pricing [25]. Users can click
the sort icons located at the top of the list to sort the groups. Hovering
over the nodes in the glyph highlights the corresponding node in the
graph view. In addition, clicking the row propagates the details of any
suspicious RPTTE group to the graph view for further analysis.
Alternative Design. We have come up with several alternative de-
signs to show the topology of related party transactions and the group
features. For visualizing the topology of related party transactions, the
Sankey diagram (Fig. 3(a2)) is the first alternative design as it can in-
tuitively show the transaction flows. However, it performed worse on
two-way trading, which would result in severe overlapping between
transaction flows. While it is possible to overcome the drawbacks by
aggregating the flow of mutual transactions, the solution will compro-
mise data accuracy by omitting the trade direction. Next, inspired by
the chord diagram showing the connections between entities, we have
designed the second alternative (Fig. 3(a3)), which aligns the traders
on a circle and uses double arrows to represent the trade direction.
However, the problem is that the profit flow information would be lost.
To provide a general preview of the profit flow without compromising
data accuracy, we design the glyph described above to show two-way
profit flow, as shown in Fig. 3(a1).
There are three alternative designs to show the group features, in-
cluding bar chart (Fig. 3(b1)), radar chart (Fig. 3(b2)), and parallel
coordinates plot (Fig. 3(b3)). The radar chart is useful in comparing
multiple quantitative variables. However, given the large number of
suspicious RPTTE groups returned by the algorithm, it is challenging
to perform inter-comparisons. Sorting the groups with a radar chart is
also non-trivial. Another design is the parallel coordinates plot. In con-
trast to the radar chart, which is used for one group, the parallel coordi-
nates plot provides an overview of the global distribution of all groups’
features. It also intuitively ranks and selects any outstanding groups
by the position of their features. Unfortunately, information overload
is a serious problem. The visual clutter, especially in the densely pop-
ulated area, prevents users from accessing all cases, which is unac-
ceptable. Finally, we adopt a simple yet elegant bar chart (Fig. 3(b1))
to show the features and provide a sort button to facilitate interactive
exploration (R2).
5.3.3 Graph View
The Graph View (Fig. 4) shows the hierarchical investment relation-
ship and related party transactions within the selected suspicious group
The direction for transferring revenue
The amount of related party transaction
The daily profit of corresponding taxpayerProfitLoss
Fig. 5. The Detail View shows the profit status of the traders who con-
ducted the related party transaction, respectively.
(R3). We employ the method proposed by Jnger and Mutzel [14] to
conduct the graph layout, as it is more efficient in a layered graph
drawing and can effectively reduce the crossed links. Also, we pro-
pose several encoding schemes to offer context for group assessment.
The color of the borders encodes the entity type of node (investor or
taxpayer), and the corresponding period-end profit status for the node
is encoded by the fill colors where the diverging color scheme is the
same as the node color of the detailed view, as is introduced in Sec-
tion 5.3.4. For the links, the type of relations uses color encoding. To
stay consistent with the color encoding scheme of the node type, blue
represents the related party transaction, while orange represents an in-
vestment. We emphasize the taxpayers with tax evasion records by
drawing an exclamation mark in the circle.
The nodes are labeled with their IDs for users to track the entity
down in the Control Panel. Through the Graph View, users can gain
an impression about whether the relevant thresholds have over-pruned
or under-pruned the group and require a rerun of the network fusion
algorithm with a different parameter setting (R1). By hovering over
the related party transactions, the common beneficial owners and the
entire ownership chain is highlighted to reveal deceptive cases where
tax evaders use a complex ownership structure to hide their identities.
Clicking on the related party transaction link propagates the details to
the detail view for further analysis.
Alternative Design. Alternatively, the force-directed layout offers
more flexibility to allow users to explore the topology of the related
party. However, it has been ruled out in the design because it confuses
our target users with no clear and consistent orientations to follow for
either the investors or the taxpayers. Another design was the Sankey
diagram. However, it failed to handle multiple flows of different rela-
tionships for the related party. Given the limitations of the previous
two design choices, we applied the Dagre layout to accomplish our
design requirements (R3).
5.3.4 Detail View
We proposed using two calendar heatmaps to visualize the profit sta-
tus of two traders who conducted the selected related party transaction
(R4). As shown in Fig. 5, we encode the cumulative daily profit with
the background color of each visual mark in the calendar heatmap.
We proposed two diverging color schemes with the help of Color-
Brewer [10], namely, the brown-blue-green and the red-yellow-green.
The former is colorblind-friendly, and the latter is consistent with con-
ventional color usages in the Chinese stock market (i.e., red indicates
profit while green represents loss).
For each related party transaction, a dot is placed on the calendar
heatmap to indicate the date, while its size encodes the transaction
amount. The fill color of the dot indicates whether the transaction in-
flicts a profit or loss on the taxpayer. Each arrow connecting the dots
indicates that the transaction takes place between the two taxpayers as
well as the profit flow direction. In most cases, the arrows are redun-
dant because users can read from the fill color of the dots to determine
the direction. However, the transactions may be performed with other
taxpayers in the same related party, so that the arrow indicators are es-
the profit status of trader Bthe profit status of trader A
b
a
Fig. 6. Design alternatives for visualizing the profit status of the traders
who conducted the selected related party transaction: a) line chart, b)
calendar heatmaps.
sential to demonstrate the direction. Nonetheless, we provide a button
to help users remove them if severe visual clutter occurs. By compar-
ing the colors of the visual marks on the same day, users can observe
and assess the influence of the related party transaction on the profit
status of the two taxpayers. A tooltip will appear to show the actual val-
ues and details of the invoice if users hover over a day in the calendar
heatmap. The toolbar supports rich interactions where users can tog-
gle between the quarterly statements and yearly statements, or switch
to another period to check their financial and transnational histories.
Alternative Design. To visualize the cumulative daily profit of the
traders, we can replace the calendar heatmaps with a line chart, as
in Fig. 6. The x-axis represents the date, and the y-axis represents
the value of the cumulative daily profit. Without radically changing
the rest of the encodings, the line chart has the advantage of showing
more clarity and scalability on some occasions.
However, the line chart has a few shortcomings compared to the
calendar heatmap. First, since the profit status of taxpayers can fluctu-
ate massively (especially for small and medium-sized enterprises), it
can result in significant visual clutter when the two lines and x-axis
intersect. Second, the line chart can create an inconsistent visual im-
pression for the same taxpayer. Due to the power difference between
traders, the scale of the y-axis has to be adjusted accordingly to fit
the limited design space. When users examine different related party
transactions that involve the same taxpayer, they might find the same
line being squeezed or stretched, creating difficulties for identification.
Third, the line chart can be overly granular because inspectors care
about the act of evasion more than the actual amount. For example, in
identifying the effective related party transactions, users have to com-
bine both visual channels: y-location of the line and color of the dots,
to look for buyers in profit and sellers in loss. This combination is less
intuitive than comparing the diverging colors of a rectangle and a dot
in proximity in the calendar heatmap. We believe that the shortcom-
ings of the line chart outweigh the benefits, leading to our final design
choice.
6 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present two real cases to demonstrate how Tax-
Themis can facilitate the detection and exploration of any suspicious
RPTTE groups. The two cases were found by the experts when they
used TaxThemis to explore tax evasion groups during our expert inter-
views, as will be introduced in Section 7.
6.1 Beyond Financial Indicators: Catching Crafty Tax
Evaders
E2 is interested in the integration of automated methods and visual ana-
lytics. He was asked to evaluate the usefulness of TaxThemis. Without
prior knowledge about the dataset, he first observed the bar chart in
the control panel (Fig. 1(A)) and noticed a cyclic pattern in the related
party transaction amount.
The patterns immediately drew his attention, and he selected the
first quarter of 2014 by clicking on the highest bar in March. He
did not change other default parameters for the algorithm because he
did not know their actual impact (R1). After running the network fu-
sion algorithm, the suspicious RPTTE groups appeared in the Group
Overview (Fig. 1(B)).
By sorting the suspicious groups in the descending order in terms
of effective related party transactions, E2 noticed that the first group
was very complicated as there were six taxpayers involved (Fig. 1(b1))
(R2). He was intimidated by its complexity and turned his attention
to the second group, which had only two taxpayers committing related
party transactions (Fig. 1(b2)).
E2 clicked on this group. Then the Graph View (Fig. 1(C)) showed
the topological relationships within the group (i.e., the investment and
trading relationships) and the attributes of the investor and taxpayers
(i.e., the taxpayers period-end profit status and historical tax evasion
records) (R3). He first noticed that all blue nodes, which are the tax-
payers, had an exclamation mark, which means they were all former
tax evaders.
Then he observed that there was only one investor (c1 in Fig. 1(C))
who owned all the other companies, which is represented by the border
color of the nodes and the topology. He had identified the common
beneficial owner with ease. Then, he turned his eyes to the fill color
of the two nodes in the left and knew that there was a taxpayer at a
profit (c2 in Fig. 1(C)) buying products from a taxpayer at a loss (c3
in Fig. 1(C)), indicating potential RPTTE behavior. The three visual
cues guided him to pursue the details of the transaction, so he clicked
on the blue edge connecting c2 and c3 to see how the related party
transaction affected their cumulative daily profit.
The Detail View (Fig. 1(D)) showed the profit status of the trades
in the calendar heatmaps and the details of the transactions with dots
(R4). From the calendar heatmaps, E2 concluded that c2 was always
making money (Fig. 1(d1)), while c3 was gradually losing money
(Fig. 1(d2)). He recognized that all related party transactions were one-
sided and inflicting cash flows from c2 towards c3. He also hovered
over a few large dots to read the tooltip that shows the actual trans-
action amount. He suspected that the two related taxpayers could be
repeated offenders of tax evasion. Then he navigated to other quarters
and found similar trading patterns between 2014 and 2015. Through
exploring different contexts of the suspicious groups, he believed that
the suspicious group was an RPTTE group that should be further in-
vestigated. He pointed out that this group would likely be overlooked
by traditional tax inspection methods using financial indicators, be-
cause its financial positions were stable and consistent. He thought
TaxThemis enabled the convenient exploration of useful context for the
suspicious group and provides users with deep insights into catching
crafty tax evaders, which may be difficult to achieve by using tradi-
tional methods such as checking financial indicators.
6.2 Towards Deep Tax Inspection: Untangling the Tangled
Transactions among Related Parties
E1 is interested in improving the audit process by effectively identi-
fying the tax evasions. He was asked to evaluate the usability of Tax-
Themis. Being an experienced tax inspector, he decided to explore
groups that were more complicated and had entangled trading relation-
ships. He selected the second year (2015) as the period of interest and
increased the maximum transaction chain length to allow more related
party transactions to be included (R1). The Group Overview then re-
ceived from the network fusion algorithm and showed the suspicious
RPTTE groups.
E1 ranked the groups by the related party transaction amount to
search for groups with higher impact (R2). Similar to Section 6.1,
after examining some groups with simple topological structures, he
found a group with five taxpayers conducting related party transac-
tions (Fig. 7(A)). He further checked the Graph View (Fig. 7(B)) and
discovered that taxpayers b3 and b4 who are different in profit status,
Fig. 7. The expert E1 examined a RPTTE group with the help of three
views: (A)The Graph Overview helped E1 find a group with complex
trading relationships. (B)The Graph View showed that all taxpayers who
conducted related party transactions had a common beneficial owner.
(C)The left half of the Detail View showed several brown dots occurred in
the calendar heatmap that is blue in general, indicating that the related
party transactions inflicted an outflow when the taxpayer is in profit. Also,
the arrows are pointing towards the right, indicating that revenue was
transferring from a taxpayer in profit to a taxpayer in loss.
and the transaction was flowing from the taxpayer in profit (i.e., b3) to
the taxpayer in loss (i.e., b4). He hovered over the transaction edge and
noticed that the control chain was highlighted to indicate the common
beneficial owner (i.e., b1) (R3). He recognized that b1 had control
over all the taxpayers conducting related party transactions. Then he
noticed that b2, an investor of b4, also invested in another company
with historical tax evasion records. He thought that b4 was the most
suspicious because b2 may provide tax evasion instructions for b1 and
profit from it. Based on the visual cues regarding the transaction direc-
tion and period-end profit status, he clicked on the trading relationship
between b3 and b4 to conduct a deeper inspection.
E1 had chosen the annual mode for calendar heatmaps (Fig. 7(C)) to
display the profit status and all related party transactions in 2015 (R4).
He saw the arrows were pointing towards b4, which indicate the di-
rection of the transaction. He found that all the transactions had been
conducted when b3 was in profit, and b4 was in loss. He noticed c1
was not connected with an arrow, which he later found out that it was
conducted by b4 with b5. Although b4 had trading relationships with
three related taxpayers, E1 used TaxThemis to effectively untangle the
complicated relationships and identify the most suspicious one with
reasonable evidence. After the exploration of the different contexts of
the group, he believed that the group was very likely to be an RPTTE
one. He would further investigate b1 and b2 because they were the
most suspicious taxpayers who conducted tax evasions in the group.
E1 commented that he really enjoyed the power of TaxThemis in help-
ing tax officers untangle complex transactions and providing guidance
on finding highly suspicious taxpayers for deeper tax inspection.
7 EXPERT INTERVIEW
We conducted remote interview sessions to verify the usefulness and
effectiveness of TaxThemis. Each interview section lasted 60 min-
utes, with a 20-minute introduction to the system and task description
through sharing our screen, followed by 30 minutes on the mining and
exploration of suspicious groups by the experts themselves using our
system with remote assistance, and finally 10 minutes for commenting
on our system. The participants were experts E1 and E2, who had
been our collaborators since the beginning stages of our study. They
helped with the formulation of design requirements, gave feedback to
our design iterations, and evaluated our system.
At the start of the interview sessions, we first introduced the four
major views in TaxThemis, the functions, the visual encoding, and
the interaction of each view, which aimed to fulfill the requirements
they helped formulate in Section 4. Then we demonstrated the sys-
tem pipeline and used a simple case to demonstrate how to use our
system to mine and explore suspicious RPTTE groups. After that, we
provided remote control to enable them to use our system to identify
suspicious tax-evasion groups on a real-world tax dataset. The experts
had different focuses for the use of our system. E1 was concerned with
the usability of TaxThemis as to whether it could improve the audit
process by identifying the tax evasions effectively, while E2 was con-
cerned with the usefulness as to whether the integration of automated
methods and visual analytics could improve the efficiency of the tax
inspection process. After conducting the two interview sessions, we re-
structured their feedback into the following three perspectives to better
summarize their opinions.
Profit Analysis Approach. The experts agreed that the profit-
oriented approach had the potential to discover RPTTE groups, which
were often omitted in the current inspection routine. They recalled
from their experience that such identification often relied on certain
confidential financial indicators. Following accounting principles,
these indicators are calculated from period-end snapshots of the com-
panies’ financial positions, which are prone to deliberate profit manip-
ulation near the end of a financial period. Our system has provided a
new perspective for taking the cash flow concept into consideration.
Although E1 was skeptical about the practical value of monitoring
profit by days and using it alone in the whole inspection routine, he
agreed that it was a good screening measure. E2 appreciated this ap-
proach because the profit and loss information granted the tax officers
more understanding of the continuous performance of the suspects.
System and Improvements. Both experts rated the system as use-
ful and efficient for related transaction identification. They thought
existing tools fell short before TaxThemis because of their inability to
provide concrete evidence or involve domain experts in the decision
process. Besides that, the anomalies caught by the financial indicators
could be a result of various factors like the macro-economic situation
and seasonal industry patterns, rather than tax evasion. The current
methods generated a lot of false positives that required many inspec-
tion resources to verify.
In comparison, E2 commented that”This system can save us much
time in eliminating false positives ...It is intuitive to see the change in
colors and how the taxpayer is affected by the transactions.” E2 fur-
ther suggested that the system could be improved by encoding extra
tax-related information such as tax reduction policies for individual
taxpayers. E1 gave credit for the entire analytics pipeline, especially
showing the financial performance as context and the related party
transactions as evidence. E1 advised that the system could increase
the decision ability if the unit price of the commodities could be incor-
porated. This is because, in the experts’ experience, most convicted
suspects used high-valued commodities to transfer profits. Addition-
ally, the suspicion level increases significantly if the unit price of a
transaction deviates vastly from the industry average. The advice is
well-noted as a direction in the future iteration of the system.
Visualization and Interaction. The experts found the visual encod-
ing scheme intuitive and easy to learn. They understood the meaning
behind the typical visual patterns. They valued the logical interactions
between views as they allowed them to navigate and narrow down the
search space quickly. Both experts stated that the Detail View was the
systems’ gem since it “decorated the plain cash-flow context with the
significant impact of each related party transaction.“ E1 commented,
“I had been dealing with numbers and tables for years ...This visual-
ization is pleasing to the eyes.“ E2 added, “Sometimes the tax officers
have different technical backgrounds. This system allows us to explain
our audit justifications intuitively.“
8 DISCUSSION
While the case studies and expert interviews have corroborated the
effectiveness and usefulness of TaxThemis, it is not without its limita-
tions, and some design choices also need further clarification.
Scalability vs. Model Precision. Scalability is an important aspect
that we carefully considered during the development of TaxThemis.
Due to the limited screen size, TaxThemis works well for suspicious
tax evasion groups with less than 15 taxpayers. However, when there
is a significantly large number of taxpayers in a suspicious tax eva-
sion group, it would result in visual clutter in the Group Overview and
Graph View. According to our empirical observations, the majority of
cases are often not as extreme, and large corporate groups are scarce
in reality. Also, due to their impact factor, large corporations are un-
der close investigation in the current inspection routine; therefore, they
are not the primary focus of the system. Users can change the related
parameters in TaxThemis to shrink the size of suspicious groups at the
cost of data precision. In terms of visualization, a possible improve-
ment could be interactive clustering as it reduces the number of ele-
ments to be displayed without compromising data precision. Besides,
the dense graph can be broken into multiple views and apply focus-
pluscontext or overview-plus-detail techniques to allow users to adjust
the graph size dynamically and interactively.
Data Availability vs. Design Choice. The system relies heavily
on the profit perspective to let users analyze related-party transactions.
In the expert interview, the tax administration officer suggested that
the unit price of commodities plays a significant role in tax inspec-
tion. In this study, the unit price is not available in the dataset, and the
data granularity has limited the design choices in this study. However,
once the unit price information is accessible, the information can pro-
vide more concrete evidence of how taxpayers conduct transfer pric-
ing, which has been left for future work. Without radically changing
the current design, the unit price information can be encoded with the
arrows in the Detail View, which is only an indication of transaction di-
rection at the moment. The redundancy in visual design has provided
room for encoding newly available data.
Straightforward Visualization Designs vs. Usability. Overall,
the visual designs of TaxThemis are straightforward and easy to under-
stand. The major visualization designs of TaxThemis are also standard
charts. For instance, the Group Overview of the suspicious RPTTE
groups’ features (Fig. 1(B)) contains a bar chart, and the Graph View
(Fig. 1(D)) employs the popular visual design of node-link diagrams.
These visualization designs are relatively simple. Such a design choice
necessitates careful designs. The target users of TaxThemis are mainly
tax inspectors with accounting backgrounds who often do not possess
a deep understanding of visualization. Therefore, a visual analytics
system with more standard charts or intuitive designs will be much
easier for them to understand and explore, greatly enhancing the us-
ability of TaxThemis.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present TaxThemis, an interactive visual analytics sys-
tem to help tax officers identify and examine suspicious tax evasion
groups. The system integrates the traditional data mining algorithm
and visual analytics techniques through an interactive analysis pro-
cessing pipeline. We demonstrated the effectiveness and usefulness
of TaxThemis through two case studies using real-world tax dataset
and interviews with two domain experts.
In future work, we will consider acquiring the latest data sources
that include the unit price in the invoice data. Also, the suspiciousness
indicators can be customized to discover patterns that domain experts
would like to explore, such as the tax burden difference and the rate
of change in profit. Furthermore, the visual summary of our glyph
design can be extended by incorporating the topological patterns in in-
vestment relationships as a widely used pattern matching method [35].
Last, we would like to advance the usefulness of our system with an
additional view to portrait groups with similar features and allow users
to select similar cases if they find one suspicious case.
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